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THE IMPACT OF HONOR CODES ON ACADEMIC CHEATING WITHIN LIBERAL ARTS COLLEGES
Heather M. O‟Neill
Christian A. Pfeiffer
Department of Business and Economics
Ursinus College
Collegeville, PA 19002
ABSTRACT
Many researchers study the subject of collegiate cheating by
focusing on demographic characteristics of cheaters at
schools of varying sizes. Other researchers examine
whether collegiate honor codes can abate rampant cheating.
A third group studies whether perceptions of what students
believe to be cheating behaviors affects actual cheating.
This paper incorporates previous research and develops of a
model of academic cheating based on three sets of
incentives - moral, social and economic – and how they
affect self-reported cheating behaviors at liberal arts
colleges. An on-line survey was administered to students
from three liberal arts colleges in spring 2008. The nearly
700 respondents provide a robust data set with nearly half of
the respondents coming from institutions with honor codes
in place. Econometric models using ordinary least squares
highlight the determinants of cheating and whether honor
codes are efficacious. The results will be useful in the
national dialogue regarding college cheating.
INTRODUCTION
Academic dishonesty remains a pervasive occurrence on
college campuses across the nation. Analyzing the acts of
cheating as reactions to three types of incentives –
economic, moral and social – one can attempt to divine the
determinants of cheating behavior. Negative economic
incentives, such as a higher likelihood of being caught or a
more severe consequence of such, imply a higher marginal
cost to cheating and therefore less cheating occurring.
Morally speaking, students are reluctant to engage in
academic cheating if they believe it is ethically
unacceptable. Additionally, if students believe cheating is
disapproved socially and leading to shame, less cheating
will occur. This paper examines these three types of
incentives and their impact on academic cheating on
selective liberal arts college campuses.
Some colleges have honor codes in place, which are
believed to reduce the incidence of cheating. Whether
this is the case, is the thrust of this paper. For colleges
entertaining the idea of the creation of an honor code, the
answer to this question is paramount. The creation of an
ineffective code is useless. This paper examines how the
effectiveness of honor codes at liberal arts colleges affects
academic cheating behaviors. Three selective liberal arts

colleges are investigated. They differ in their campus
culture toward academic dishonesty by having different
stated policies regarding academic integrity. The first
school has a long-standing, nationally regarded honor
code in place. The second recently introduced an honor
code, but it is not as well entrenched in the campus
culture. The third college is currently engaged in
discussions to institute an honor code, although a
documented academic standards policy is made available
to students. This paper seeks to quantify econometrically
the impact of honor codes on cheating behaviors by
concentrating on the incentives inherent in honor codes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In 1963, Bowers administered a survey to more than five
thousand American college and university students and
produced a dissertation on his findings the following year.
This breakthrough study was one of the earliest academic
studies on college cheating behavior in America. Later
research by Don McCabe, professor of organization
management at Rutgers University, took this further and
broke student behavior down into various categories of
cheating, examining the relative levels of increase within
each grouping.
He found cheating on tests and
examinations had grown from 39% in the 1963 survey to
64% in 1990. Also, cheating on written assignments had
remained steady, increasing only by a single percentage
point, from 65% to 66%. Younger generations, however,
had a decreased understanding of what constituted
plagiarism and how to define cheating behavior (McCabe,
2005).
Numerous studies focus on student demographic indicators of
cheating behaviors. Earlier studies suggest males were more
likely to cheat than females, but recent studies say the gap
has narrowed if not disappeared (Becker, Ulstad, 2007;
Jones, Bichlmeier, & Whitley, 1999; McCabe & Trevino,
1993). Higher student GPAs have been shown to have a
negative correlation with the cheating behaviors of college
students (Burrus, McGoldrick, & Schuchmann, 2007; Crown
& Spiller, 1998; Levy & Rakovski, 2007; McCabe &
Trevino, 1993). This has been attributed to the high cost of
penalties associated with cheating for high performing
students; students with high GPAs have a lot to lose if they
are caught cheating. Extracurricular activities such as sports
have been shown to influence a student‟s tendency to cheat

(Burrus et al., 2007; Butterfield, McCabe, & Trevino, 1999).
Sports participation understandably puts excess pressure on
students because of the amount of time they require on a
regular basis. This pressure exists because there is then less
time for student-athletes to pursue their course obligations,
which leads to more academic cheating. Participation in a
fraternity or sorority has also been linked to an increased
tendency to cheat (Burrus et al, 2007; (Butterfield, McCabe
,& Trevino, 1999). Older research has suggests that Greek
organizations encourage cheating by keeping files with old
papers, assignments, and tests for brothers/sisters to use
(Hamalian, 1959; Drake, 1941). More recently, however, it
has been shown that this increased tendency to cheat comes
more out of the social nature of these groups. In Self Reports
of Student Cheating: Does a Definition of Cheating Matter?
it seems that the reasoning for this is that these organizations
allow for the development of tightly knit friendships and
communities and most cheating occurs between friends
(Burrus et al, 2007). Because Greek organizations foster
these friendships they have been associated with higher
incidences of cheating.
Recently MBA programs have become scrutinized their
reported cheating behavior (Mangan, 2006; Sharda, 2006).
Graduate schools have been noted for their competitive
nature and also for the “type A” personalities that such
environments attract. Competitive undergraduates apply to
these schools and often exemplify cheating behaviors in
graduate school at a higher rate because of their focus on
results (Willin, 2004). This could indicate one of two things.
It could show that there is a significant difference in culture
between undergraduate and graduate institutions. At the
same time, such results could also indicate that top
performing students are less likely to report their cheating
behavior in their undergraduate work, and more candid when
they reach the graduate level. In addition to this, there are
also external factors that can influence graduate behavior
such as pressure which “type A” students are willing to
accept from a current employer or the anxiety to obtain a
high paying job upon graduation (Sharda, 2006).
Knowledge of punishment for cheating behavior can also
form an important contextual factor in ethical decision
making. The severity of punishment for cheating thus
becomes the value which a student must weigh against the
benefits he/she will gain from not being caught. It has been
found that as the perceived severity of punishments increases,
the levels of individual cheating are lower (Burrus, et al.,
2007; Butterfield, McCabe, & Trevino, 2001). While some
schools have protocols for students to receive an academic
warning for cheating, others simply expel cheaters. When
there are no standardized repercussions for cheating and
when current rules are not enforced, a cheating culture
develops (Callahan, 2006). Thus, a cheating culture absorbs
into it a wide array of variables creating a collective

environment that can either abate or encourage academic
integrity.
Several researchers have studied the subject of collegiate
cheating in relation to honor codes, specifically how effective
codes are in reducing cheating (Arnold, Martin, Jinks, Bigby,
2007; Burrus et al, 2007; Butterfield, McCabe, Trevino,
2001; Butterfield, McCabe, Trevino, 1999; McCabe &
Trevino, 1993). Their results generally indicate that for an
honor code to witness less cheating behavior, the code must
be well understood, respected and strongly abided by faculty
and students, i.e., embedded in the campus culture. McCabe
and Trevino note three reasons why honor codes are expected
to reduce academic dishonesty: 1) the academic integrity of
activities are clearly delineated, 2) students‟ moral compasses
are more likely to be aroused and 3) honor codes come with
highly desired liberties that would be abolished if the code or
cheating were to occur (1999).
Other research links the perception of what signifies cheating
to cheating behaviors (Bisping, Patron, Roskelley, 2008;
Callahan, 2006; Hard, Conway, Moran, 2006; McCabe,
Trevino, Butterfield, 2002). Ranking activities in terms of
their degree of cheating severity is used to show a negative
correlation with both the frequency and likelihood of the
activities. For example, one of the most severe forms of
cheating, purchasing a term paper and handing it in as one‟s
own work, would occur very infrequently. In comparison, if
students believed seeking help from peers on homework was
trivial cheating at best, greater frequency of this activity
would be reported.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
During the spring semester of 2008, a web-based survey
was sent to the student body of three small liberal arts
colleges. Student participation in this survey was voluntary
and completely anonymous. All three colleges stress the
importance of academic honesty on their respective websites
and within their mission statements. Two of the schools
currently use honor codes that fit into Mendelez‟s definition
of traditional honor codes (1985). Both have written pledges
of honor that must be signed by students upon enrollment
and students are expected to write an honor pledge on any
graded assignment given to a professor. The schools‟ honor
boards comprise students who work with faculty advisors to
ensure that code violations are adjudicated. Both codes
extend beyond the academic realm and into the social
sphere, and outline acceptable conduct while on campus.
Each school recognizes people make mistakes, thus offer
grace periods for people to consider offensive actions and
turn themselves in if appropriate. Doing so can lead to
lesser punishments. Each school also encourages students
who observe misconduct to confront the problem first with
the alleged student violator, and if the issue cannot be
resolved, to then take it to the honor board.

The honor code of one school, HONCOL1, was established
in 1896, making it one of the oldest in the US. This code is
voted upon each spring by all students, which enables it to
change as the times change and clearly demonstrates the
seriousness of purpose and credibility the code lends to the
campus culture. Moreover, visiting the school‟s website
looking for the generic overview of the college leads one to
a pronouncement of the school‟s honor code. The second
college‟s honor code, HONCOL2, was originally initiated
by student and faculty votes in 1976 to cover academic
issues. It was extended to social norms in 1994. A list of
five common academic infractions and the definitions of
such, including plagiarism, copying other student‟s work
while submitting it as one‟s own, falsifying laboratory
results, etc., are delineated for students. The code is not
advertised overtly on the college‟s website, although it can
be found by using the search option, which leads one to the
code within the academic catalog. The third college,
NOCOCECOL, does not have an honor code, although
discussions regarding one have taken place, but it does list
the school‟s statement on academic honesty while clearly
delineating examples of academic dishonesty in the student
handbook. Like the second college, it takes some searching
to find the statement on academic honesty. According to the
schools‟ faculty handbooks, all professors in all schools are
expected to discuss academic honesty in the classroom and
state policies on syllabi.
Of the total 3,992 undergraduate students who received an email containing a link to the survey, 686 students participated
for a 17% response rate. The sample sizes at the three
colleges varied with 312 responses from HONCOL1, 127
responses from HONCOL2, and 247 responses from
NOCODECOL. The response rates were at 26.7%, 10% and
15.7 % for HONCOL1, HONCOL2, and NOCODECOL,
respectively.
The survey comprised 61 questions intended to extract
demographic, campus culture, perceptions of cheating and
incidences of cheating from the students. A matrix of fifteen
potential cheating behaviors, drawn largely from McCabe‟s
2003 index of academic integrity, was created (McCabe,
Trevino, Butterfield, 2003). Students were asked to indicate
how often they had undertaken a particular action and the
degree to which the perceived the action was considered
academically dishonest.
Table One lists the fifteen
behaviors, although question five was included as a ruse,
since it is not considered cheating by anyone.
The percent of students responding as undertaking a stated
behavior once or more is presented in parentheses in Table
One. Using technology to procure answers on exam recorded
the lowest frequency at 2.8% , followed by purchasing a
paper or handing in someone else‟s paper as one‟s own at
3.5%, and copying another student‟s work as one‟s own at

4.7%. Unauthorized use of a crib sheet, copying another
person‟s answers on an exam, and allowing someone to copy
one‟s own exam answers yielded percentages of 13, 14.4 and
16.8, respectively. Hereafter these six behaviors are referred
to as the most egregious forms. The highest frequency
occurred with 47.2% of students saying they had worked as a
group when individual work was assigned.
The percentage of respondents who contended a behavior
indicated either moderate to severe cheating is in bold
brackets in Table One. The most egregious cheating
behaviors are in the 90 percent and above range and they are
the six behaviors with the lowest use frequencies as noted
above. Not surprisingly, there is a strong negative correlation
(p=.72) between the percent of students cheating once or
more and the percent who believe the action is more than
trivially dishonest.
Table Two presents descriptive statistics from the survey.
Thirty seven percent of the respondents were male, 29% had
an honor code in high school, and although not shown in the
table, the respondents were fairly evenly dispersed across the
four class years. The percent of students participating in
college athletics was 35%. HONCOL1 does not have Greek
social organizations, thus the 13% from the survey who are
such members come from the other two schools. Twelve
percent are business or economics majors and 86% intend to
go to graduate school in the future (35% for an MBA.)
Eighty percent of the respondent‟s fathers attended college
and 82% of their mothers did.
The overall mean GPA for respondents was 3.4on a 4.0 grade
scale with little disparity across school: HONCOL1 (3.44),
HONCOL2 (3.43), and NOCODECOL (3.37). This is
roughly an A- average on the four point scale, indicating
students with higher GPA scores were more likely to take
survey, which may bias the results. The average verbal and
math SAT scores were 665 and 647, respectively.
Some variables were coded as ranges. Using midpoints of
the ranges to establish means led to an average annual family
income of $179,307, a mean of 5.53 hours spent working for
pay per week and an average of 14.9 hours per week studying
outside the classroom. Eighty three percent of those surveyed
said the severity of consequences either fit the crime or were
too severe, suggesting harsh punishment exists.
Two cheating indices were created. The first, egregious
cheating frequency, concerns the aforementioned six cheating
behaviors. Students who do not engage in a behavior are
given a value of zero, whereas those saying they have
engaged in it once or more are given a score of 1. The sum
of these six dummy variables per student forms the egregious
cheating frequency. Its mean is .55, suggesting less than one
of the egregious forms is undertaken on average. In fact,
71% indicated they did not engage in any of the six, 15%

admitted to one of the infractions, and 12% accounted for 2-3
misconducts. Only eighteen students reported 4-6
occurrences. The second index is more encompassing, using
the summation of dummy variable scores for the fourteen
behaviors. The mean is 3.26 with 20% reporting no instances
of cheating, and 15% reporting engagement in one or two
forms. Fifteen percent admitted to 6 or more forms of
cheating at least once or more from the fourteen listed
activities. The mean of 3.26 implies very little cheating, akin
to cheating in just three of fourteen categories. As one can
see, both indices are skewed right, reiterating relatively few
reported instances of cheating per student.
Likewise, two cheating perception indices were created, each
measuring whether students perceive activities to be no,
trivial, moderate or severe forms of cheating. These answers
are scored 0-3, respectively. A maximum score of 42 is
conceivable if a student states all fourteen conducts are
severe forms of cheating. The minimum score of zero would
occur for any student who did not believe any activities
denote cheating. The cheating perception index yielded a
mean of 30.28 with a minimum of seven and maximum of
22. The mean suggests an average between trivial and
moderate cheating for the fourteen categories. The egregious
cheating perception index for the six noted behaviors is
16.87, implying moderate to severe responses for the six
activities. Indeed, 52.5% of respondents indicated all six
forms were severe.
MODEL OF CHEATING BEHAVIOR
Based on previous literature, college cheating is determined
by student demographics, incentives and the existence of an
honor code. Equation (1) represents a multiple regression
model for cheating with these three vectors of determinants.
The dependent variable is a cheating index for either six or
fourteen activities.
.
CHEATINDEXi = β0 + βd*DEMOGRAPHICSi + βc*INCENTIVESi
+ βh*HONCOLt + Єi
(1)
* where i = student, t=school,
stochastic error

and Єi represents the

Demographic Variables
The right hand column of Table Two shows the expected
sign of the coefficient in the regression model based on
previous literature. For example, students wishing to pursue
an MBA are more likely to engage in cheating behavior, thus
the positive sign. Gender contains a question mark because
the literature shows mixed results. Traditionally, males have
been more inclined to cheat, but recent literature maintains
there is no longer a greater proclivity for males.
The
negative sign on GPA means the higher a student‟s GPA, the
less cheating they will undertake since the student has more

to lose if ultimately caught. Signs of zero appear when the
literature has not studied the factor‟s impact on cheating.
These can be thought of as control variables. Lastly,
although the literature does not address the number of hours
worked on cheating behaviors, the expected sign is positive.
The more hours spent working, the less time available for
studying, thus an added pressure to find a shortcut to get
things done.
Incentive Variables
Two social incentives expected to reduce cheating behavior
are adverse reactions from parents and peers if one is caught
cheating. Negative social stigmas should reduce cheating.
Conversely, if there is a sense that cheating is pervasive on a
campus and everyone does it, there is no social stigma, and in
fact its pervasiveness will encourage cheating so students can
remain competitive. The harsher the consequence of being
caught cheating, less cheating behavior is expected,
according to the economics of crime literature. Morally, if
one perceives an act as cheating, one‟s moral compass would
lead one to cheat less. The signs on the two cheating
perception indices are therefore negative.
Honor Code Presence
While the above variables‟ impacts on cheating are
interesting, the most salient question we raise concerns the
impact of an honor code on cheating, ceteris paribus. Rather
than using the existence of an honor code as a single dummy
variable in the regression equation, the schools are entered
separately. HONCOL1 embraces and advertises it code, and
its code is nationally renowned. HONCOL2 is the dummy
variable for the second code school. The same rigor and
enthusiasm is not apparent in the second honor code college,
thus the desire to separate their inclusion. Differences in
projected reductions in cheating behaviors relative to the
non-honor-code college can be examined.
RESULTS
Two models using ordinary least squares were estimated, as
shown in Table Three. Model One estimates the cheating
index for all fourteen activities. Due to missing values, the
sample size fell to 607.
The statistically significant
demographic factors are having an honor code in high school,
a quadratic form of GPA, and the intention of attending an
MBA program in the future. According to the predicted
quadratic results for GPAs suggests increases in GPAs above
2.15 reduce the cheating index. Being an athlete, male or a
member of a Greek organization has no effect on the index.
Peer of parental disappointment do not affect cheating
behavior, contrary to expectations. Although these two
social norms are not significant, the third one is. If students
believe cheating is rampant and everyone does it, they too

will cheat. This occurs holding other factors constant,
including attending an honor code college. The severity of
punishment is also not significant in Model One.
Our attention is focused on two of the independent variables:
honor code and the cheating perception index. The predicted
impact on the cheating index is statistically significantly less
for the college with the renowned honor code relative to the
non-code school. Coming from that honor code school,
ceteris paribus, suggests a 1.18 point decrease in the index,
which is quantitatively large relative to the index mean of
3.22. On the other hand, there is no statistically significant
difference in the index for the second code school relative to
the non-code school. The perception index is also highly
statistically significant in Model One, implying the greater
the severity of a behaviors being considered cheating, the
lower the cheating index. For Model One, the impact is a
predicted decrease of .18 or a 5.5% drop from the mean.
Model Two concentrates on the six most egregious forms of
cheating and the results differ in some cases from Model
One. Being male, having a lower GPA, the intention of
obtaining an MBA and being an athlete are associated with
higher egregious cheating behaviors.
Adverse parental
reaction is now statistically significant with a predicted drop
in the index of .195, while the other social norm of “Every
One Does It” remains a strong instigator to cheating.
Model Two‟s results regarding cheating perception and honor
codes reiterate Model One‟s findings. The quantitative
impact from HONCOL1 is even greater, a .249 predicted
decline in the cheating index relative to the mean of .55. The
perception index is only built from the six cheating behaviors
in Model Two. A unit increase in the index is expected to
decrease egregious cheating behavior by .135 points, which
represents 24.5% decline from the mean.
CONCLUSION
Preliminary results from this rich data set provide initial
evidence that perceptions of the severity of academic
cheating behaviors and the existence of honor codes play a
role in academic dishonesty at liberal arts colleges.
Specifically, the more severe a student perceives an academic
cheating behavior to be, the less cheating behavior will be
undertaken. This is true regardless of whether the college has
an honor code or not. This suggests schools can reduce
cheating behavior through actions that raise awareness of
what constitutes cheating.
Having an honor code, in and of itself, is not sufficient to
thwart cheating. Unless the code is embedded and embraced
by the college community, a code will not rectify cheating.
Again, it is incumbent upon schools with honor codes to
elevate them to a level wherein the faculty, students and

administration revere them. Schools entertaining the idea to
institute a code need to be mindful of this connection.
Given the self-reported nature of cheating behaviors, the
element of measurement error is real. Simply put, cheaters
are liars, suggesting cheating behaviors are underreported. If
they are, however, underreported across all campuses, the
bias is not as bad. Self selection of who responded to the
survey can also bias results, but fixing that problem is not
possible. Both of these data issues affected other researchers,
so at least we are all comparing one set of biased results to
another with similar biases.
Lastly, the study would benefit by having more colleges
involved in it. Originally, ten schools within the same
athletic conference were approached to allow the on-line
survey to be administered anonymously. These schools are
similar in many ways and compete for the many of the same
students. Unfortunately, only three colleges were willing to
participate. While extremely grateful to those schools, we
find it upsetting that others were unwilling to have their
students represented. For some school administrators, there
seemed to be a fear of what the results might show. Leading
without sufficient information is not generally the road to
success.

Table One
Behavior (percent doing once or more) [percent who believe it’s moderate or serious cheating]
Doing less than your fair share of work on a group project (28.4%)
[21.3%]
Fabricating or falsifying a bibliography, lab, or research data (27.1%) [69.1]
Paraphrasing a few lines from an online or print source without citing it (40.2%) [65.6%]
Purchasing or obtaining a paper either online or from someone else and turning it in as your
Q4 own (3.5%) [99.8%]
Q5 Marking all the same letter when answering Scantron multiple choice examination questions
Q6 Copying homework from another student (41.4%) [70.7%]
Q7 Seeking help from other students in your class on a take home exam (28.1%) [78.9%]
Q8 Working as a group when individual work is assigned (47.2%) [51.9%]
Working with someone over e-mail or instant messaging on an individual assignment (31.9%)
Q9 [49.6%]
Q10 Copy and pasting another student‟s work and turning it in as your own (4.7%) [98.2%]
Q11 Using text messaging or other technology to get answers on test information (2.8%) [99%]
Q12 Copying off of another student during a test or examination (14.4%) [98.2%]
Q13 Allowing someone to copy your answers during a test or examination (16.8%) [99%]
Using crib notes (unauthorized by a professor) to answer test or examination questions (13%)
Q14 [92.9]
Q15 Using a false excuse to get an extension on a paper or other class assignment (27%) [60.1%]

Q1
Q2
Q3

Table Two
H0

Demographic Variables

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

GENDER

686

0.37

0.48

0

1

HIGH SCHOOL HONOR CODE

686

0.29

0.45

0

1

GPA

660

3.4

0.45

0

4

SAT VERBAL

663

665

96

0

800

SAT MATH

668

647

98

0

800

MBA INTENTION

686

0.25

0.43

0

1

GRAD SCHOOL INTENTION

686

.86

0.34

0

1

COLLEGE ATHLETE

684

0.35

0.48

0

1

GREEK MEMBER

684

0.13

0.33

0

1

DAD COLLEGE

686

.80

0.39

0

1

MOM COLLEGE

686

.82

0.38

0

1

FAMILY INCOME

650

179,307

176,685

25,000

750,000

WORK FOR PAY HOURS/WEEK
Moral,
Social and Economic
Incentives

686

6.51

5.53

2.5

28

BAD PARENT REACTION

686

0.79

0.41

0

1

BAD PEER REACTION

686

0.42

0.49

0

1

EVERY ONE DOES IT

686

0.25

0.43

0

1

+

HARSH PUNISHMENT

686

0.83

0.38

0

1

-

ALL 14 CHEATING PERCEPTION

633

30.28

5.65

7

42

EGREGIOUS SIX PERCEPTION

667

16.87

1.85

1

18

686

3.26

2.96

0

14

686

0.55

0.12

0

6

Dependent Variables
ALL 14 CHEATING BEHAVIORS
EGREGIOUS SIX CHEATING
FREQUENCY

?
+
0
0
+
0
+
+
0
0
0
+

-

-

Table Three
MODEL ONE
Dependent Variable= CHEAT INDEX 14
Dependent Mean=3.22
Adjusted R2=.379 N=607
Variable

Estimate

INTERCEPT
7.891
HONCOL2
0.267
HONCOL1
-1.183
GENDER
0.149
HS CODE
-0.355
ATHLETE
0.190
GREEK
0.097
PERCEPTION INDEX -0.182
BAD PARENT REACT -0.004
BAD PEER REACT
-0.205
EVERY ONE DOES
0.586
HARSH PUNISH
-0.259
WORK FOR PAY
0.026

MODEL TWO
Dependent Variable= CHEAT INDEX 6
Dependent Mean=.55
Adjusted R2=.175 N=641

Pr > |t|

Estimate

Pr > |t|

<.0001
0.3807
0.0001
0.4439
0.0845
0.3278
0.7405
<.0001
0.9376
0.3604
0.0122
0.2849
0.1286

2.766
-0.067
-0.249
0.290
0.304
0.168
0.042
-0.135
-0.195
0.005
0.197
-0.099
0.005

<.0001
0.5642
0.0288
0.0006
0.0014
0.1069
0.7423
<.0001
0.0606
0.9621
0.0551
0.3590
0.5152
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